Largely ignored by previous studies is the public goods dimension of agricultural enThe adoption of multiphase electric power ergy inputs which necessitates some type of for electric irrigation has been limited in an public or collective choice. When producarea characterized by extremely rapid ex-tion or consumption of a particular energy pansion of irrigated acreage despite produc-source requires collective effort, convention cost advantages. Theoretical and tional market mechanisms are often inadeempirical evidence of failure in the existing quate for allocating such energy supplies. market for multiphase power development When such market failure exists, non-market are presented. Alternative development alternatives can be used to allocate energy mechanisms are presented and discussed.
alternatives for developing multiphase power exclusion and rivalry in consumption, a confor agricultural irrigation.
sumer simply purchases additional amounts until an optimum is achieved.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
For public goods, if one individual voluntarily provides the good, others may enjoy Multiphase electric power development can the goo thout payment or for a nominal benalzedin puli god fra k the good without payment or for a nominal be oanalyzed in a public goods framework, fee. Initial customers create positive exterThe two key elements of a pure public good nonexclusiveness in nalities for future customers who cannot be include nonrivalry and nonexsiveess in excluded from consumption. Voluntary conconsumption (Randall) . Nonrivalry results tributions from these subsequent consumers when the marginal cost of an additional user uneri e s consumers are uncertain since some consumers underof a public good is zero or when the good their true demands for the good in is joint impact in nature (Schmid) . Nonex-hopes of enjoying the good without payment clusiveness or high exclusion costs result cl s or hh e n cs ret or for a nominal fee. Unless collective activity when exclusion of potential customers is not is successful in extracting the appropriate feasible (Musgrave; Samuelson) . The use of payment from each customer, the level of the term "public" refers only to the nature the p c oo pro the group as a of consumption and does not prescribe the the public good provided by the group as a of consumption and does notprescribe the whole is likely to be below the optimal level. nature of the producer (Bish) . nature of the ecproducer (Bish) . The underprovision of public goods by priMultiphase electric power development is mechanisms is herein referred vate market mechanisms is herein referred characterized by both nonrivalry and nonexa "market failure clusiveness. Nonrivalry refers to the relaillurae e ial lel tionship between users when an additional Figure 1 illustrates the optimal level and tionship between users when an additional marginal prices of multiphase power develmultiphase power user is connected to an opment with public good characteristics existing multiphase line. Once the lines are ih p 2 he demnd schedules DI Dc constructed, an additional user has little efis p 2 he demand s ul and D 3 illustrate the demand for multiphase fect on the availability of power to other ad D 3 istrate e dendividu als.The de customers. Hen, n r impower by three different individuals. The decustomers. Hence, nonrivalry is embodied in mand schedule PG is a vertical summation (multi-mand schedule PG is a vertical summation the physical properties of the good (multi-of the individual demand curves and reprephase power) and its method of distribution sents aggregate demand for the public good. (power lines).
The nonexclusive properties of multiphase power derive more from the legal environment rather than the physical properties of the good. State statutes prohibit EMC's from charging differential rates to agricultural customers along a multiphase power line, regardless of differences in customer con-Price tributions to initial development costs. Once a line is built, new multiphase power users need only pay the marginal costs of bringing the power from existing multiphase lines to their farms. After these marginal costs are paid, exclusion of multiphase power customers who have not contributed to the costs of developing the initial or trunk multiphase lines is not possible.
The nonrivalry and nonexclusive nature of public goods creates special problems for allocating resources to public goods. These A vertical instead of a horizontal summation sented as evidence that: (1) transactions costs is appropriate for a public good because the exceed the benefits of collective action, (2) summed demand represents the total amount private markets for multiphase power develall three consumers are willing to pay to opment have failed, and (3) multiphase obtain a particular output which is available power development may require suppleto all potential users. For example, the third menting private market mechanisms. consumer is willing to obtain output R at The concept of market failure used herein price P 4 for his use. However, at that price is descriptive rather than prescriptive in nathe first and second consumers may consume ture. In other words, the existence of market R output without payment. If transactions failure is not sufficient evidence that a noncosts are zero, the three consumers could market alternative is either superior or deachieve net gains by providing output S sirable. The choice of institutional arrangethrough collective activity. At S, the sum of ments for multiphase power development their marginal evaluations is equal to the must take into account the positive and negmarginal cost. The first consumer contributes ative distributional consequences of market P, to the cost of an additional unit of output supplements. These market supplements and at level S and some amount less than his total their distributional consequences are adbenefits (the area under his demand curve dressed in this paper. up to S). In the presence of transactions costs, uncertainties and strategic bargaining over DATA the financing of the intramarginal units, private markets may fail to provide the optimal The data used in this analysis were obtained level of the public good.
from a survey of EMC's in Georgia. Georgia The example given illustrates that the ef-has 42 EMC's which serve in excess of 72 fectiveness of collective economic activity percent of the land area in the State and over in providing an optimal level of a public two million customers. The survey was mailed good is influenced by transactions costs. In to the operating manager of each cooperative a world of imperfect knowledge, transactions in September 1981. Fifty-two percent or 22 costs take the form of information, contrac-of the surveys were completed and returned. tural, and policing costs (Rogers; Dahlman) . The responding cooperatives represented Identifying and informing potential benefi-every region of the State including metrociaries of collective action and measuring politan, rural agricultural, and rural non-agindividual demands involve information costs. ricultural areas. However, the respondents Reaching a collective agreement and making were concentrated in the southeast and southsome collective bid involve contractural costs west portions of the State. This area includes while protecting the assets of collective ac-the dominant agricultural and irrigation areas tion involves policing costs. When transac-of the State. The majority of nonresponses tion costs exceed the potential gains from were in urban areas or nonagricultural areas. collective action, such action may not be Thus, the problem of nonrespondent bias was forthcoming or it may be less than optimal thought to be relatively minor in this ex- (Dahlman) .
ample. The respondents provide electric Empirical research on transactions costs is service to 338,394 residential, 13,152 inlimited due to the non-market and non-mon-dustrial, and 21,418 specifically designated etary components of such costs. Factors which agricultural customers. The average coopinfluence transactions costs and the ability erative served approximately 17,000 total for groups to act collectively include: (1) customers with over 90 percent of these cusgroup size, (2) the degree of member par-tomers classified as residential. A summary ticipation (Buchanan and Tullock), (3) dis-of the information obtained from the retribution of member preferences (Kafoglis spondents is included in tables 1 and 2. and Cebula), (4) personal and group wealth, Information was also obtained in the survey (5) potential gains from group participation, on interruptible power service, which is a and (6) sense of community (Schmid) .
relatively new option service for Georgia Relationships between the above charac-electric companies. This option allows a teristics and transactions costs will not be power company to temporarily disconnect fully explored in this research. Instead, the service during a peak use load; the most absence of collective action in the devel-common contractural interruptible period in opment of multiphase power will be pre-Georgia is between 4:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. In exchange for this potential peak load in-cooperative for multiphase line installation. terruption, the user receives a discount on A lower cost cooperative, one that paid all power. Discounts available on this type $6,800 per mile for line installation, charged of service averaged 38 percent with a range its customer the full costs of construction. of 60 percent to no discount. Since this op-Other lower cost cooperatives did not charge tion could be used in most irrigation situa-their customers for multiphase line instaltions, its potential is analyzed in this paper. lation. While some variation in costs of construction would be expected, the variation MARKET FAILURE IN MULTIPHASE in charges for multiphase power indicates POWER DEVELOPMET that some cooperatives may be responding All of the respondents offered multiphase to the externalities and financing the collecpower with a total of 2,221 industrial and tive aspects of the power development. 266 agricultural customers reported in the While a rigorous analysis of all factors which survey. A parent organization provides the contribute to market failure will not be atconstruction service of multiphase line for tempted, some relationships between the all of the EMC's in Georgia. Construction consumer demand for multiphase power decosts, a limiting factor in multiphase devel-velopment and transactions costs can be inopment, averaged $16,235 per mile although ferred from the data.
2 Transactions costs of the range of these costs was from $6,000 to collective action such as information, orga-$25,000 per mile. Variations in construction nizational, and bargaining costs among curcosts were attributed to the following factors: rent and future users reduce the effective (1) difficulty of terrain, (2) limited number demand of individual or collective action of routings, and (3) existing territorial bar- (Rogers) . High development costs and high riers such as county boundaries or city limits. transactions costs were thought to be asso- vestment were amortized over a longer period than 7 years, annual capital requirements The impact of market failure in multiphase would be lowered and the breakeven dispower development can be analyzed by es-tances in Table 3 would increase timating efficiency gains from substituting iure resents a oteticl multiphase power for diesel fuel in agricul-for potential users of multiphase power as tural irrigation cost estimates. For this analy-irrigators. Three fields that are topographisis, 50-, 100-, 150-, and 200-acre center pivot cally suited for center pivot type irrigation systems were considered. Currently, more form the basic scenario for this example. Each than 91 percent of these systems are diesel field is owned by a different individual and powered (Skinner 1982a and 1982b) . The all fields are served by an EMC that offers Oklahoma State Irrigation Cost Program interruptible service and charges customers (Kletke et al.) was utilized to calculate op-$16,235 per mile for multiphase line conerating costs for the systems. A break-even struction. A multiphase line currently exists length of multiphase power line was calcu-6.6 miles from a connection point to field lated for each system with the following A, 4.4 miles from a similar point for field B, equation:
and 4.3 miles from field C. These distances TCE -TCD were arbitrarily chosen for the simplicity of (1) BED = subsequent calculations. Fields A and C are MDC^/m~ile 200-acre fields while field B is a 150-acre where:
field. Individual construction costs of multiphase power for fields A, B, and C are re-BED = break-even distance, spectively: $107,151; $71,434; and $69,810. TCE = total annual costs for electricity,
The location of each field with respect to TCD = total annual costs for diesel, and the existing power lines prohibits further MDC = multiphase development cost.
electrical development since ownership of The development cost per mile utilized in the fields is partitioned among three individthe analysis was $16,235, which was the uals and the location of each field exceeds average from the survey, Table 2 .
the breakeven distances calculated in Table  Results of this cost analysis are summarized 2. In the absence of subsidies by the EMC in Table 3 . Total system investment ranges or collective action by the farmers, the only from $56,468 for a 50-acre electric system viable option for those farmers desiring irto $90,504 for a 200-acre diesel system. Po-rigation is a diesel powered system. tential savings of $2,787 per year for a 50-
The absence of development is inefficient acre system, $3,972 per year for a 100-acre for the three fields as a whole. For example, system, $5,490 for a 150-acre system, and the total mileage of lines required to serve $8,026 for a 200-acre system are available all three fields in Figure 2 is only 8.1 miles. for electric power users without an inter-The total breakeven mileage for the three ruptible service option. The annual savings fields without interruptible service is 7.4 range from $3,059 to $8,770 using an in-miles. Potentially, if each of these individuals terruptible service option. With these sav-were irrigating using electric power, $21,542 ings, producers could finance construction in total annual savings would result.
4 Furof 1.2 miles of multiphase line for a 50-acre thermore, through collective action these ansystem and 1.7 miles of line for a 100-acre nual savings less transaction costs would system. A producer with a 150-acre electric finance the entire line construction expense system could finance construction of 2.6 miles in 2 years. of multiphase line without an interruptible
The potential savings through collective service option and 2.8 miles of line with action must be contrasted to the transactions a Total investment costs include all development costs required of an adequately sized well. For the electric systems, the total investment costs include the cost of developing the electric line from the field edge to the center of the field at $1.50/foot.
b Fixed costs include depreciation, taxes, insurance and interest. Purchase costs are amortized over 7 years at an annual interest rate of 10.5 percent. c Variable costs include fuel, lubricants, repairs, and labor. Fuel costs are based on $0.043/KWH for electricity and a diesel fuel cost of 1.10/gallon. The cost of electricity decreased to 0.027/KWH using an average interruptible service option. $6,000 per mile cost and the average construction cost for the cooperatives in the State Field A would be $10,235 which could be propor-_200 acres tionally distributed among the customers of the EMC. Subsequently, the breakeven distances would increase to 7.1 miles for a 150-acre system and 10.2 miles for a 200-acre *^~~~ E ~system.
In this situation, private development N is feasible for all fields. However, the incidence of costs will vary depending on who initiates the development. First, consider the 150 acres owner of field A financing development to his field. The owner of field B could then .-I~~ _ install an electric irrigation system receiving j~~~~E -a positive externality by paying no installation costs and the owner of field C would externalities to fields A and C. Only if one individual owned all fields would no externalities arise. costs of collective action. For example, should the owner of field A pay more of the devel-SUPPLEMENTING MULTIPHASE opment costs because his field is farthest from POWER DEVELOPMENT the existing line? While such problems may be resolved with private bargaining in the This study presented evidence of the poexample in Figure 2 , the transaction costs tential gains from developing multiphase for joint private action would likely be pro-power for agricultural irrigation. When these hibitive for a group of realistic size (Buch-potential gains are inhibited by market failanan and Tullock; Kafoglis and Cebula) or ure, some form of supplement might hasten where strategic bargaining is excessive. This the development of multiphase power. A research did not attempt to systematically summary of the legislative provisions govmeasure the actual transaction costs associ-erning Georgia EMC's is helpful in this inated with collective action among landown-stitutional analysis. ers. Instead, this research hypothesized that Prior to July 1, 1981, the EMC's were govthe lack of the development and use of mul-erned by the Georgia Electric Membership tiphase electric power was evidence that Corporations Act (Georgia Code, 1981) . Sectransactions costs of collective action may tion 34B-310 specifically prohibited electric have exceeded potential savings (revenues) suppliers from discriminating against or in from collective action.
favor of any consumer within a class of conOne method which may reduce the need sumers or any class of consumers. Similar for private bargaining is subsidization of de-provisions in section 45-3-11 of the Georgia velopment by the EMC, which appears to be Code currently govern this requirement. Secpractical in some cases. To illustrate this tion 34B-115 prescribed certain requirepossibility, assume that the producers in Fig-ments concerning rates, fees, rents, and other ure 2 are served by an EMC that pays $6,000 charges for electric energy, facilities, and per mile for power line construction and supplies furnished by the EMCs. Among the requires its customers to pay all of this con-more important requirements: (1) each EMC struction expense. The savings between the had to be operated without fit profit to its mem-
